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the ability to deter, he does not consider that stronger countries have incentives
to use their power to take economic advantage of weaker ones—to treat them, in
other words, as banana republics. Similarly, unless all countries did away with their
weapons simultaneously, the countries that kept them would have overwhelm-
ing power with, again, incentives to take advantage of others. Consider terrorism.
Even if most terrorism is a response to the foreign policy of liberal countries, is
this true of all? In modern society a handful of individuals can do enormous
damage. Huemer does not consider that one reason for the relatively small num-
ber of recent deaths from terrorism is the huge resources governments have used
to thwart them. With changes in foreign policy, Huemer assumes most terrorists
would desist. But would they? More likely, to ðmisÞparaphrase Trotsky: under
anarcho-capitalism, you may not be interested in terrorism, but terrorism is
interested in you.
In conclusion, Huemer has developed an important argument. Coupling his
account of anarcho-capitalism with his critique of authority renders each side more
powerful. But there is much to argue with on both sides of his case.
George Klosko
University of Virginia
Kagan, Shelly. The Geometry of Desert.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. xviii1656. $74.00 ðclothÞ.
Other things being equal, people ought to get what they deserve. If there is such
a thing as common sense, this claim is part of it. But life is complicated, and this
claim does not get us very far. Suppose I could give A what he deserves or give B
what she deserves, but not both; what should I do? For Shelly Kagan this ques-
tion lies on the known edge of a huge expanse of unexplored philosophical ter-
rain. The Geometry of Desert is Kagan’s report on what he found there.
Actually, “report” is too slight a word for this book. At over six hundred
pages, it is monumental in both size and achievement.
The book’s length makes it impossible for me to adequately summarize its
contents. So I will limit myself to presenting and commenting on a few of Kagan’s
central claims.
Kagan begins with several assumptions:
• There is such a thing as “moral desert.” ðAnd the book aims at a theory of
moral desert only.Þ Jones might deserve a raise. But this is not an example
of moral desert if it has its source in facts about social institutions ðmaybe
his union contract specifies when employees are due raisesÞ. In a case of
moral desert, Jones must deserve something in virtue of his “moral sta-
tus”—because he is a good person or because he always does what he
should; something like that. ðKagan does not have a definite view about
what goes in to determining someone’s moral status. As a shorthand, he
just speaks as if it is how virtuous or vicious someone is that matters.Þ
• The right place for a theory of desert is in the theory of the good, not the
theory of the right. Certainly people ought to get what they deserve, but
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this is not where we should start building our theory of desert. We should
start from the ðmore controversialÞ claim that it is a good thing when
people get what they deserve.
• Virtuousness is a “quantity”: any person X must be more or less or just as
virtuous as a person Y. And if X is more virtuous than Y, then there is an
answer to the question how much more virtuous he is ðtwice as much,
maybe, or three times as muchÞ.
• Welfare is the “currency” of moral desert. Roughly speaking, this means
that what the virtuous deserve is to be living good lives, lives that are high
in welfare, or well-being. As with virtue, welfare is a quantity.
With these in the background, Kagan explores the possible answers to two ques-
tions: one about “noncomparative” desert and one about “comparative” desert.
Here is the question about noncomparative desert:
ðNCÞ Consider a situation in which Jones’s “level of virtue” is X and his
level of welfare is Y. Ignore other people ðif anyÞ who exist in the situation;
ignore how Jones compares with them ðwith respect to virtue and welfareÞ.
How good is this situation, from the perspective of desert? That is, what is
the number Z such that the intrinsic value of this situation, from the per-
spective of desert, is ðrepresented byÞ Z?
Importantly, Kagan is asking about value from the perspective of desert. The
overall intrinsic value of this situation will depend on how good it is from the
“perspective” of other values and how all these values combine. ðThere is an-
other assumption here: that desert is separable from other things that are good,
that it makes sense in the first place to rank situations in terms of value-from-
the-perspective-of-desert. Not all philosophers who give desert a role in their ax-
iology believe this. Fred Feldman, e.g., presents a “desert-adjusted axiology” in
“Adjusting Utility for Justice,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 ½1995:
567–85. On his view the extent to which people get what they deserve affects the
intrinsic value of a situation, but not, as I understand it, in a way that can be
separated from other influences.Þ
Kagan represents answers to ðNCÞ using two-dimensional diagrams, in which
theX-axis represents welfare levels and theY-axis represents value-from-the-per-
spective-of-noncomparative-desert. Figure 1 sums up the kind of answer to ðNCÞ
that Kagan prefers. Each “mountain” gives value as a function of welfare for some
fixed level of virtue. The key features of Kagan’s answer are ðiÞ the existence of
peaks, ðiiÞ shift, and ðiiiÞ bell motion.
Peaks: for each level of virtue V the “value graph” for V is shaped like a
mountain; it has a highest point, a peak.
Shift: if virtue level V is greater than U, then the peak welfare level for V is
greater than the peak for U.
Bell motion: if V is greater than U, then the mountain for virtue level V has
“swung” further counterclockwise than the mountain for U. As a result, the
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“western slope” of the mountain for V is steeper, and the eastern slope is
shallower, than corresponding slopes of the mountain for U.
That is a geometrical description of Kagan’s view. What does it come to in
axiological terms? Peaks is easy: it says that for any virtue level V there is a level of
welfare W such that a situation containing a single person with virtue level V is
as good ðfrom the perspective of desertÞ as it can possibly be if and only if that
person’s welfare level is W. For the next two, let Victor have virtue level V and
Ursula have value level U, where V is greater than U. Shift says that the welfare
level Victor must receive for things to be as good as they can be from the per-
spective of desert is greater than the corresponding welfare level for Ursula. Bell
motion is the most complicated of the three. Suppose ðfrom now onÞ that virtue
levels U and V are both nonnegative. Then bell motion says that ðaÞ it is worse
if Victor’s welfare level is N units lower than his peak value than if Ursula’s wel-
fare level is N units lower than her peak and ðbÞ it is better if Victor’s welfare
level is N units higher than his peak value than if Ursula’s welfare level is N units
higher than her peak. ðThese inequalities are reversed if V and U are both neg-
ative. Also, I am assuming that Victor’s and Ursula’s peaks have the same height.
If they do not, then characterizing bell motion is more complicated.Þ
Peaks, shift, and bell motion are true of the answer to ðNCÞ graphed in fig-
ure 1, but they do not completely characterize that answer. These three features
leave it open whether ðfor exampleÞ the peaks are all the same height and the
slopes of the mountains are straight lines ðas they are in fig. 1Þ. Kagan discusses
at length whether an answer to ðNCÞ should have these ðand otherÞ properties.
In fact the list of additional properties he investigates, and the range of consid-
erations for and against them that he considers, is daunting in its comprehen-
FIG. 1.—Kagan’s answer to ðNCÞ ðnote that T < U < VÞ
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siveness. But I do not have space to explore what he says about these other fea-
tures. So let’s think a little more about the three I have described.
I should say that defending a particular view about desert is only one of
Kagan’s goals. He is just as interested in systematically exploring the space of pos-
sible theories and is generous toward views that disagree with his. Still, let us ask:
Why think a correct answer to ðNCÞ will have these three features?
A natural way to defend the existence of peaks is to appeal to this premise:
ð1Þ For any virtue level V there is a welfare level W such that anyone with
virtue level V deserves to have welfare level W. ðAnd this is the complete
story about what, in an “absolute” and noncomparative sense, people de-
serve.Þ
Premise ð1Þ does make the existence of peaks plausible, for then their existence
follows from the plausible thesis that things are best, from the perspective of des-
ert, when people get exactly what they deserve.
Kagan does appear to believe ð1Þ, but it is not clear to me that he can use it
to defend the existence of peaks. For when Kagan says what he means by “abso-
lute desert,” he offers this definition: “what one absolutely deserves, let us stipu-
late, is the particular level of well-being marked by one’s peak” ð162Þ. Kagan ap-
pears here to be defining “X ðabsolutelyÞ deserves welfare level W” as “X’s peak
is at W.” But then ð1Þ is definitionally equivalent to the existence of peaks and
cannot be used to justify it. ðFurther evidence that this is what Kagan is doing
comes later in the book. He writes that if value graphs are straight lines rather
than mountains, then “the concept of absolute desert seems drained of content ’’
½207. This is so only if the absolute desert is defined in terms of the shapes of
value graphs.Þ
I would prefer to do things differently. I think it would be better not to offer
a definition of “X ðabsolutelyÞ deserves W” but to take it as well-enough under-
stood without a definition. Premise ð1Þ, then, which is independently plausible,
could be used to justify the existence of peaks.
Let us suppose that we do things this way. Does ð1Þ entail the existence of
peaks? Could a situation fail to be best from the perspective of ðnoncomparativeÞ
desert even though the person in that situation is getting exactly what he de-
serves? This is an important question. Thinking about it raises another impor-
tant question: What is “the perspective of desert”? What does it take for one sit-
uation to be better than another from the perspective of desert? Here is a natural
proposal:
ð2Þ Situation R is better than situation S from the perspective of desert if
and only if the people in R are closer to getting what they deserve than the
people in S are.
If ð2Þ is correct, then the existence of peaks follows from ð1Þ and the claim that
ð1Þ is the full story about what each person ðnoncomparativelyÞ deserves.
Kagan sometimes writes things that suggest ð2Þ. For example, he seems to say
that the value, from the perspective of desert, of a situation is high to the extent
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that “people are getting what they deserve to a high degree” ð50Þ. In the next
paragraph, he writes that value from the perspective of desert is the contribution
to “overall” intrinsic value “due to the fact that people are getting ðor failing to
getÞ what they deserve.” Statements like this appear throughout the book ðan-
other is on p. 186Þ. But there is also reason to think that Kagan must reject ð2Þ.
Think about bell motion. It says that a situation in which Victor’s level of welfare
is N units below the level he deserves is worse than a situation in which Ursula’s
level of welfare is N units below the level she deserves ðassuming, as I continue
to do, that Victor’s and Ursula’s peaks have the same altitudeÞ. But Victor is just
as close to getting what he deserves as Ursula is. ðMany things Kagan does in the
book seem incompatible with accepting ½2, including ½i Kagan’s willingness to
entertain the thought that a situation in which Victor gets exactly what he de-
serves is better than a situation in which Ursula does and ½ii Kagan’s willingness
to entertain the thought that a situation in which someone receives more than
he deserves is no worse than one in which he receives exactly what he deserves
½see sec. 4.3 on “the V-shaped skyline” and sec. 5.1 on “plateaus”. This is all tex-
tual evidence that Kagan must reject ½2; he has informed me that he does, in
fact, reject it.Þ
It is worth mentioning, although this is a bit of a digression, that whether
Victor and Ursula are just as close to getting what they deserve depends on how
we measure how close someone is to his deserved welfare level. If we measure it
by looking at the distance ðabsolute value of the differenceÞ between welfare
received and welfare deserved, then Victor and Ursula are just as close. But there
are other ways to measure closeness. We could, for example, measure it by look-
ing at the ratio of welfare received to welfare deserved. ðThen Victor is closer to
getting what he deserves than Ursula is.Þ But measuring closeness using this ra-
tio does not help reconcile bell motion with ð2Þ. And using the ratio measure
runs into trouble when people deserve a welfare level of zero. ðKagan mounts a
chapter-long attack against using this ratio, and one of his arguments against it
focuses on the “zero problem.” However, I should emphasize that Kagan is not in
that chapter attacking the use of this ratio to measure how close someone is to
getting what he deserves. Since Kagan rejects ½2, facts about how close someone
is to getting what he deserves play no role in his theory, and so he has no need
for a way to measure this quantity.Þ
There is another option worthmentioning. Onemight say that the right way
to measure how close someone is to getting what he deserves is not the differ-
ence between what he deserves and what he gets but instead the difference be-
tween the value from the perspective of desert of the actual situation and the
value from the perspective of desert of the situation in which he gets exactly
what he deserves. For what it’s worth, I do not think this is a very natural way to
measure how close someone is to getting what he deserves. ðI think it is more
plausible as a measure of how close a situation in which X gets N units more/less
than he deserves is to a situation in which X gets exactly what he deserves. This
is ½more or less what Kagan uses this quantity to measure in pt. 3—officially, he
uses it to measure “offense against noncomparative desert.”Þ But the point I want
to make is that while this way of measuring closeness makes bell motion com-
patible with ð2Þ, reconciling them this way comes ðI thinkÞ with a cost. It makes
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ð2Þ true by definition. If ð2Þ is true by definition of closeness, then ð2Þ does not
help us get an independent grip on what the perspective of desert is. But that
is what I wanted to use it for.
So what, then, is the perspective of desert? That, I think, is the million-dollar
question about this book. My default understanding of this perspective is given
by ð2Þ. That is not how Kagan understands it, and he does not offer an alterna-
tive definition. Still, it is rarely possible in philosophy to define all of one’s tech-
nical terms, and other readers may feel that they know exactly what Kagan is talk-
ing about.
It might be thought that we could get a better grip on “value from the per-
spective of desert” if we looked at Kagan’s reasons for finding bell motion plau-
sible. In the section on bell motion, he says many times that it is better, from the
perspective of desert, to “undercompensate” ðby some fixed amountÞ a less vir-
tuous person than a more virtuous person. But this is just to repeat ðpart ofÞ bell
motion. Is there a more fundamental thought that can justify it?
Kagan often states the idea behind bell motion ðan idea he calls “fault for-
feits first”Þ in comparative terms: if we must give one person less than he deserves
and the other exactly what he deserves, it is better if the less virtuous person
receives less. But this way of putting things is risky, for we are still talking about
what is better from the standpoint of noncomparative desert. Maybe it is only
better to shortchange the less deserving from the standpoint of comparative
desert.
Comparative desert encompasses facts about how each person’s welfare
level and deserved welfare level compare to others’. And it is worth pointing out
that if we say that the idea behind bell motion is true only when we take com-
parative desert into account, the problems bell motion raises for ð2Þ go away. For
suppose that a “comparative desert” claim like this is true:
ð3Þ If X is more virtuous than Y and each must receive less than he
ðabsolutely, noncomparativelyÞ deserves, then X comparatively deserves to
be closer to his noncomparative desert level than Y is to hers.
Now consider two situations:
Situation A: Victor and Ursula are each N units below their peak.
Situation B: Victor is N 2 1 units below his peak, and Ursula is N 1 1 units
below hers.
In each situation, the sum “difference between Victor’s welfare level and ðnon-
comparativelyÞ deserved welfare level 1 difference between Ursula’s welfare
level and ðnoncomparativelyÞ deserved welfare level” is the same. But if ð3Þ is true,
the situations are not exactly the same with respect to how close each person is
to getting what he or she deserves. For the facts about what Victor deserves are
not exhausted by what he noncomparatively deserves. He also comparatively de-
serves to be closer to his noncomparatively deserved level than Ursula is to hers.
In situation B, he is getting what he ðcomparativelyÞ deserves; in situation A, he
is not.
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So at least some of the ideas that motivate bell motion may be coming from
comparative desert. But even though Kagan sometimes uses comparative exam-
ples when discussing bell motion, he thinks it is a noncomparative phenomenon.
To think about whether he is right, we need to keep our intuitions unsullied by
comparative thinking. We need to consider four situations: ðiÞ Victor is at his
peak, ðiiÞ Ursula is at her peak, ðiiiÞ Victor has N units of welfare less than his
peak value, ðivÞ Ursula has N units less than her peak value. Bell motion says that
the difference in value, from the perspective of noncomparative desert, between
ðiÞ and ðiiiÞ is greater than the difference in value between ðiiÞ and ðivÞ. But, as I
have said, I am not sure why this should be true if ð2Þ is true. I do not mean to say
that bell motion cannot be defended as a noncomparative phenomenon. But I
would like to see a defense of bell motion that had more “internal structure”
than the defense Kagan gives: one that relies on a more detailed characterization
of the perspective of desert, like ð2Þ, possibly combined with some further claims
about what, beyond being at some particular welfare level, people deserve. ðOn
p. 234 Kagan gives an argument for bell motion that does not use comparative
language. It is better for a saint to have N units more than he deserves than for
him to have N units less than he deserves. But for sinners it is switched: then it is
better to have less. So the saint’s “mountain” is rotated relative to the sinner’s.
Interestingly, in sec. 10.1 Kagan considers whether bell motion occurs in the do-
main of comparative desert and argues that it does not. I cannot summarize the
argument here, but it is worth noting that at one point he uses noncomparative
bell motion to try to account for the intuitions that seem to motivate comparative
bell motion.Þ
Now that comparative desert has come up, let me say a few things about
Kagan’s view on it. If “It is a good thing ðfrom the perspective of noncompara-
tive desertÞ when someone gets what he deserves” is a platitude about noncom-
parative desert, “It is a good thing ðfrom the perspective of comparative desertÞ
when the more virtuous people are better off than the less virtuous people” is a
platitude about comparative desert. As with noncomparative desert, Kagan wants
a much more detailed theory than this platitude alone provides. The question
Kagan addresses is
ðC1Þ Suppose there are N people and their welfare levels and virtue levels
are given. How good is this situation, from the perspective of comparative
desert?
Kagan’s survey of the possible answers to this question is a tour de force. Pro-
ducing an even somewhat-detailed answer to this question presents many chal-
lenges; Kagan finds ways around many of them, even when exploring ideas that
he himself rejects. Unfortunately, I lack the space to say anything about ðC1Þ
and so must ignore the ingenious arguments that occupy the last one hundred
pages of the book. Before he gets to the full ðC1Þ, though, Kagan discusses a re-
stricted version of it, which I do want to comment on:
ðC2Þ Suppose there are two people, Victor and Ursula, with deserved wel-
fare levels D1 and D2. Suppose that Victor’s welfare level is W1. What welfare
level must Ursula be at for comparative desert to be “perfectly satisfied”?
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Suppose Victor is getting far more than he deserves. He has one hundred units
of welfare more than he deserves. This scenario is far from ideal from the
standpoint of noncomparative desert. But, Kagan says, it is still possible for it
to be ideal from the standpoint of comparative desert. For it to be ideal, Ursula
must also get more than she deserves. The question is, how much more must
she get to perfectly satisfy comparative desert? Kagan’s answer is
Y gap: suppose that W1 > D1 and let Y be the difference, in value from the
perspective of noncomparative desert, between ðiÞ a situation in which Vic-
tor deserves and receives D1 units of welfare and ðiiÞ a situation in which
Victor deserves D1 and receives W1 units. Then comparative desert is per-
fectly satisfied if and only if Ursula receives that welfare level W2 such that
W2 > D2, and the difference, in value from the perspective of noncom-
parative desert, between ðiiiÞ a situation in which Ursula deserves and re-
ceives D2 units and ðivÞ a situation in which Ursula deserves D2 and receives
W2 is equal to Y. ðThe case where W1 < D1 is exactly parallel.Þ
That is a mouthful; a perfect illustration of the benefits of Kagan’s visual ap-
proach to these questions is that the Y gap view is much easier to represent in
a diagram. In figure 2, the Y-axis ðas beforeÞ represents value from the perspec-
tive of noncomparative desert. Then perfect satisfaction of comparative desert
requires that Victor’s and Ursula’s “Y gaps” be equal ðand that they are both
over, both at, or both under their deserved levelsÞ.
I have said that I am unsure what the perspective of noncomparative desert
is; I am equally unsure what the perspective of comparative desert is. I would
have guessed that ð2Þ is as true of comparative desert as it is of noncomparative
desert. That is, just as I expected a theory of noncomparative desert to start with
FIG. 2.—Y gap view illustrated
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a bunch of claims about what people noncomparatively deserve and to then
say that a scenario is noncomparatively good to the extent that people in it get
what they noncomparatively deserve, I expected a theory of comparative desert
to start with a bunch of claims about what people comparatively deserve and to
then say that a scenario is comparatively good to the extent that people in it get
what they comparatively deserve. ðClaim ½3 above is an example of a claim about
what someone comparatively deserves.Þ
But this is not how Kagan thinks about the issues. He never connects value
from the perspective of comparative desert to things that people comparatively
deserve. I suspect that if we do think about comparative desert this way, then
the Y gap view looks less plausible. Kagan’s main argument for the Y gap view is
this:
ð4Þ Comparative desert is perfectly satisfied if and only if Victor’s and
Ursula’s situations “offend against noncomparative desert” by the same
amount.
ð5Þ The Y gap is the correct way to measure offense against noncompar-
ative desert.
Kagan offers ð4Þ as a plausible premise that does not need any defense. But if
things are good from the perspective of comparative desert to the extent that
people get what they comparatively deserve, then ð4Þ does not seem that plau-
sible. For then ð4Þ would have to follow from
ð6Þ Each person comparatively deserves it to be the case that each person
offends against noncomparative desert to the same degree.
And ð6Þ, especially in conjunction with ð5Þ, does not seem to be in keeping with
the background assumption that welfare is the currency of moral desert. That
background assumption suggests that what people comparatively deserve is for
their welfare level to bear some relation to the welfare levels of others. And
while ð6Þ is equivalent to some claim of this form, Kagan thinks that ð6Þ is the
right way to put his view; he thinks that it is the concept of “offense against
noncomparative desert” that value from the perspective of comparative desert is
“tracking.”
There are lots of initially plausible alternatives to ð6Þ that treat welfare as
the currency of comparative desert. I have already mentioned one, claim ð3Þ
above:
ð3Þ If X is more virtuous than Y and each must receive less than he ðab-
solutely, noncomparativelyÞ deserves, then X comparatively deserves to be
closer to his noncomparative desert level than Y is to hers.
Here is another, an alternative to ð3Þ:
ð7Þ Each person comparatively deserves it to be the case that each per-
son’s welfare level is as far above ðor below, as the case may beÞ the welfare
level he or she ðabsolutely, noncomparativelyÞ deserves as everyone else’s.
Book Reviews 425
This content downloaded from 018.101.008.092 on May 14, 2018 05:12:00 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Recall that ð3Þ corresponds to bell motion, thought of as a comparative phe-
nomenon. ðA more detailed version of ½3 would specify how much closer X
should be than Y, as a function of the difference in their levels of virtue.Þ Claim
ð7Þ is incompatible with comparative bell motion, which I find plausible. Still,
let me briefly focus on it. Claim ð7Þ fits with an alternative to the Y gap view,
namely,
X gap: suppose Victor has N units of welfare more ðlessÞ than he deserves.
Then comparative desert is perfectly satisfied if and only if Ursula receives
N units of welfare more ðlessÞ than she deserves.
Kagan does consider the X gap view. He rejects it because he assumes that it is
meant to be consistent with ð4Þ but to reject ð5Þ ðsee the discussion around
p. 408Þ. But the X gap view need not be combined with the idea that the dif-
ference between welfare deserved and welfare received is the right way to mea-
sure offense against noncomparative desert. The view looks much better if we
reject ð4Þ altogether and replace it with ð2Þ and ð7Þ.
Kagan’s book is so rich that I have only begun to scratch the surface, but I
must stop. I have said that I would prefer to build a theory of desert on founda-
tions somewhat different from those Kagan uses. But a theory should be judged
by the shape of the whole edifice, not just the ground it is built on. Kagan in this
book has set a high standard for how much of that edifice can be revealed and
how well its parts can be seen to fit together. Kagan starts with a comprehensive
theory of noncomparative desert, uses it to develop a restricted theory of compa-
rative desert ðan answer to ½C2Þ, and then, astoundingly, goes on to integrate that
answer into a relatively complete answer to ðC1Þ. My suggestions should not be
taken seriously as alternatives to Kagan’s view until their consequences are worked
out at a comparable level of detail.
Bradford Skow
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Landemore, He´le`ne. Democratic Reason: Politics, Collective Intelligence, and the Rule
of the Many.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013. Pp. 304. $39.50 ðclothÞ.
Critics of democracy have long argued that the people are not competent to gov-
ern themselves. Political issues are often difficult to understand and address. Mak-
ing good political decisions would thus seem to require a high level of knowledge
and skill. Yet democracy gives decision-making power to individuals with no spe-
cial political expertise. Insofar as the quality of political decisions matters, democ-
racy’s advocates face the challenge of defending its epistemic credentials.
He´le`ne Landemore’s Democratic Reason presents a deep and original argu-
ment for democracy’s ability to produce better decisions than rivals. The argu-
ment builds on research that aims to show that cognitive diversity—roughly, “the
existence of different ways of seeing the world” ð5Þ—is at least as important as
individual ability for a group’s collective problem-solving and predictive abilities.
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